Archive for the ‘Cerebros’ Category

Kenny Smith is one of my computational linguistics professors in Edinburgh University. He is great at guiding you through complex mathematical concepts related to language, with a northern accent and a laid-back attitude. On his series of papers about linguistic models of language acquisition, he covers a very wide range of issues in the evolution and transfer of language […]


On the paper “On learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs”, Rumelhart and McClelland aim to explore the ability of networks to extract rules from the input given to them in a different fashion to what traditional rule systems use. This arises in connection to the argument about the LAD  (Language Acquisition Device), where humans […]


While the connectionist approach shows great potential and it has been at the forefronts of many an advance in the field of cognitive science and AI in general, there still remain a number of important challenges. Let’s have a look at Elman’s favorite issues.


On the book Rethinking Innateness, by Elman et al, we’re given an introduction to the advantages of connectionism as an explanative model of human development and language acquisition. Connnectionist models are usually built up of a number of nodes interconnected by communication channels. These nodes recieve biased activation and depending on their internal threshold function, […]


In this paper by Frank Jackson, he introduces himself as a ‘qualia freak’. He argues that certain sensations and experiences cannot be accounted by a physicalist approach. A physicalist approach only considers physical information to be the “correct” kind of information, yet he argues that there are things that cannot be described just in terms […]


In this article Nagel draws our attention towards the role of consciousness in the mind-body problem, attacking reductionist theories. He tries to show that there is no reduction concept available to deal with consciousness and goes on to explore these implications, by beginning with an account of the nature of consciousness.


Terrence Horgan and James Woodward defend Folk Psychology on their paper “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay” from the attacks of Churchland and Stich, arguing that none of them has provided convincing reasons for doubting Folk Psychology as a method of explaining individuals. They base their critique on the overly stringent conceptions of the interactions […]